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Abstract 
 
The increasingly popular trend of conceptualising education in terms of “customer 
service” is, in some ways, attractive. It encourages educators to think in terms of 
meeting students’ needs and to develop innovative ways to deliver their “product.” In 
other ways, however, it fails to convey the essential collaborative, participatory, 
reciprocal relationship that is central to effective teaching and learning. With respect to 
academic integrity, the customer service model also obscures students’ roles and 
responsibilities. In this paper, we identify some of the ways this model provides an 
inappropriate metaphor for understanding the project of teaching and learning (i.e., 
education) and argue that, when embraced uncritically, the model has the potential both 
to undermine education and at the same time derail efforts to develop and sustain a 
culture of integrity. After identifying this model’s shortcomings, we suggest ways to 
develop and promote a more robust model in which faculty and students work together 
toward a shared purpose while recognising and embracing their interlocking 
responsibilities. 
 
Customer service as a conceptual model for education  
 
There are many reasons why customer service has become increasingly popular as a 
way to conceptualise higher education. Indeed, some features that recommend it are 
compelling: We should strive to be responsive to student needs in much the same way 
that businesses try to anticipate and meet the demands of the market. We must 
compete for the best students in a way that is similar to businesses competing for 
customers. Accordingly, we have indeed come to recognise the benefits of advertising, 
marketing ourselves, and inspiring “brand loyalty”. Additionally, whether we like it or not, 
because of decreasing public funding, higher education is increasingly subject to 
market forces. In fact, for public universities at least, the ability to carry out the mission 
often calls for entrepreneurial activity aimed at making universities self-sustaining 
financially. So too, we know that we must respond swiftly and intelligently to trends in 
International 
Journal for 
Educational 
Integrity 
4 © International Journal for Educational Integrity Vol. 2 No. 2 December 2006 pp. xx-xx  ISSN 1833-2595  
order to remain on the cutting edge and be able to offer the latest and greatest in 
courses, facilities, and approaches. At the same time, however, we must be cognisant 
of the ways in which what we do in higher education differs from commerce. Similarities 
can be pressed too hard, and when they are, what looked to be sheer gain can end up 
being an unbalanced and infelicitous mix.  
 
A re-examination 
 
Sometimes it is helpful to think in a new way, to see things differently, because, inter 
alia, things that were not seen or appreciated previously come into view, perhaps 
revealing new possibilities/approaches that hold great promise for success in an 
undertaking. In a complex multi-faceted undertaking, however, one has to be careful not 
to adopt an explanatory schema uncritically; what works very well with one facet of the 
operation – in the sense of revealing new possibilities and approaches, for example, 
may be unhelpful or counterproductive in another. It is important to recognise the 
limitations inherent in each approach – the ways in which the analogy (in this case, the 
analogy of customer service to teaching and learning) falls short. Failing to do so can 
limit the potential usefulness of the approach, and frustrate the operation as the new 
way of thinking meets with resistance from practitioners better positioned to see and 
anticipate problems than administrators or managers who work some distance from the 
trenches.  
 
There is another reason for care in the choice of how to see and talk about things. How 
we conceptualise an undertaking can shape our choices and actions. We can see the 
need for caution in the business arena, where people have been encouraged to think of 
business as war, a money making machine, a race, or a game; to believe that 
Machiavelli and Attila the Hun are good managerial role models; and to see all business 
people as entrepreneurs, for example. Discussing these ways of thinking about 
business, each of which must be rejected, because (first) they misrepresent business, 
Robert Solomon puts the key point forcefully:  
 
How we talk reflects how we think, and how we think affects how we act and the 
nature of the organizations and institutions we create for ourselves. If we talk like 
brutes and we think like brutes, we will act like brutes and build organizations 
suitable only for brutes. To be sure, even in such organizations, some people will 
prosper, but life for most of them will be nasty, brutish and short. (Solomon, 1989, 
p. 12) 
 
The key point bears repetition. There is a connection between the way we talk and the 
way we think; the way we think influences our actions, including those involved in the 
creation, maintenance, functioning and success of the institutions we work in. Indeed, 
this point is presupposed when ideas such as those Solomon rigorously and decisively 
critiques are put forward. Trouble is, these ways of thinking about business (that 
Solomon debunks) are, in fact, pernicious. Our point is softer than Solomon’s, since, as 
we shall see, the customer service model has some felicitous applications in colleges 
and universities. The same can not be said of the suggestion that Attila the Hun is a 
good managerial role model. Still, like Solomon, we have two main points: (1) the way 
we are asked to think about higher education does not accurately represent the 
relationship at the heart of the enterprise of teaching and learning, that is, the 
relationship between teacher and student, and (2) because of this it frustrates the 
maintenance, functioning and success of the enterprise and, not incidentally, our efforts 
to promote academic integrity. We will argue, therefore, that we should not use 
customer service terms to conceptualise education because, as Kenneth Burke points 
out, “the nature of our terms affect[s] the nature of our observations” (Burke, 1989, p. 
115).  Choosing a set of terms, therefore, is significant, because in choosing, one 
highlights some aspects of the thing described and obscures others. “[By] its very 
nature as a terminology, it must be a selection of reality” (Burke, 1989, p. 166). Put 
more simply, the way we talk about what we do matters in part because it affects how 
we think about it.  
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Customer service  
 
The customer service model, which has its roots in the total quality movement that 
started with William Edwards Deming (Lomas, 2007, p. 31) has been aggressively 
promoted in higher education. The idea that has been pressed is that an embrace of 
this model is imperative, “given the fact that in order to be effective organizations must 
be customer-driven,” (Maguad, 2007, p. 334) or, alternatively, the model must be 
embraced because “even the best organization in the world will be ineffective if the 
focus on ‘customers’ is lost” (Grant & Anderson, 2002, p. 23). Resisters are told that 
properly understood the model is “generally applicable to all kinds of organizations”; 
moreover, “[e]veryone of us is a customer. Everyone of us serves 
customers” (Maguad, 2007, p. 334). Those of us who resist thinking of our students 
as customers are told to “wake up and smell the coffee,” and stop thinking that there 
is something special about higher education (Lomas, 2007, p. 33). 
 
Managerial principles applied in commercial service organisations and other 
public-sector service organisations, such as health trusts, hospitals. and local 
councils, are just as relevant in a higher education context. Managerialism is 
universal and, as Ritzer (1996) suggests, consumers in universities require the 
same standardisation, reliability and predictability as they do when purchasing 
a burger meal or dealing with their bank. (Lomas, 2007, p. 33) 
 
Interestingly, the extraordinary and tortured efforts to salvage the notion that students 
are customers reveal much of what’s wrong with pressing the idea in the academy, or 
more precisely, in the arena of teaching and learning. The extent to which the 
definition of “customers” must be stretched to include students illustrates the 
significant differences in the two groups.  
 
Part of the confusion stems from a conflation of educational and business functions 
within universities. Clearly, there are customer service functions within institutions. 
Entities such as student housing (analogous to other real estate), food services 
(analogous to restaurants), and even some functions of bursar’s offices (analogous to 
banks) may, or should be run with an eye toward customer service. When it comes to 
the education of students, however, the goals, functions, practices and relationships 
are different from what one finds in commercial undertakings.  
 
Commercial enterprises provide goods or services in a way that allows them to “make 
a profit, i.e., to obtain some value in excess of what [it] had before the exchange 
which is sufficiently flexible that it can be put to uses other than the immediate 
satisfaction [of the] needs and desires” of the provider (Camenisch, 1981, p. 62). With 
an eye to achieving this two-fold purpose a commercial enterprise will set itself to 
attracting customers who will buy – and continue to buy – its product or service. In the 
case of a product, there is a transfer or exchange of ownership and the provider’s 
holdings of the product that has been exchanged are diminished; the business needs 
to make more widgets.  
 
It’s fair to say that the educational enterprise is supposed to deliver something –
knowledge – which will then be “owned” by the student. But while commercial 
enterprises can (and often do) measure success in terms of repeat business, in 
education one measure of success is that the student “gets” the “product” the first 
time and need not come back a second time; repeating a course represents failure – 
a bad thing – rather than “brand loyalty” – a good thing. The point can be seen from 
the other side as well: A brewery, for example, wants its customers to keep buying 
beer. That customers would learn to brew beer for themselves and thus reduce their 
reliance on the brewery runs contrary to the business model. Further, the transfer of 
knowledge that occurs in education does not diminish the provider’s holdings and 
prompt the provider to produce more. To be sure, educators are interested in and 
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strive to increase knowledge, but what’s going on here is quite unlike the situation in 
business where, for example, having delivered widgets to many customers, more will 
have to be made in order to have a supply adequate to meet demand. Moreover, the 
delivery of knowledge does not entail a change of ownership – instead, it is an 
extension of ownership; the educator still “owns” the knowledge that has been given 
to the student – it has simply been shared; the student’s acquisition of knowledge 
does not diminish in any way the educator’s supply. 
 
One aspect of “return business,” of course, is customer satisfaction. This is a 
commonplace familiar to most people from the old saying that “the customer is always 
right”. Where market forces operate, the buyer is right in this sense: it is not in the 
interest of the seller to question or criticise the customer’s views since doing so would 
quite likely thwart his effort to make a sale (Lomas, 2007, p. 35). In commercial 
transactions, then, and in the ordinary understanding of the term, customers are the 
ultimate arbiters of quality, which is, of course, the linchpin of customer satisfaction. It 
is evident that advocates of the customer service model in higher education recognise 
the obvious problem here in thinking of students as customers, yet they insist on 
using the word “customer”. For example, Maguad writes, “The term customer can be 
defined as the recipient or beneficiary of the outputs of work efforts or the purchaser 
of products and services” (2007, p. 334). That this definition would have us calling 
those persons whose wartime deaths are called collateral damage, as well as the 
victims of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 customers does not slow him 
down. Without missing a beat he writes, “Students are appropriately viewed as 
customers in the sense that they are beneficiaries with needs that should be satisfied. 
This view does not imply that they are the ultimate arbiters of quality in the 
commercial sense” (Maguad, 2007, p. 335). Later in the same article he lists several 
other ways in which students, though properly seen as customers, “differ from your 
typical business customers” (Maguad, 2007, p. 339). They are, he says, “admit[ted] 
selectively based on certain academic standards and requirements,” they are 
sometimes “prevent[ed] ...from purchasing ...[higher education] products and 
services,” and “often do not totally pay for the full cost of their tuition and fees”. 
Further, once admitted students “are continually tested and graded”; moreover, they 
“must maintain their good academic standing in order to be able to take more 
advanced courses and complete their programs of study” (Maguad, 2007, p. 339). 
Would we be mistaken to suggest that by this account students are customers only in 
a Pickwickian sense? Perhaps it would be more politic to say it is a highly theoretical 
sense. Either way, the problem is the same. Those who hear the term take it not in a 
Pickwickian or theoretical sense, but in its ordinary sense, i.e., the sense in which the 
term is most commonly used. More than one student has said, during the advising 
meetings in which they choose courses to fulfill university requirements, that they 
don’t understand why they are required to take courses that they have no interest in. 
“I’m paying for the courses – why can’t I choose the ones that I want?”. When seen 
through the lens of a customer, this seems a perfectly reasonable expectation 
whereas when seen through the lens of a student, the expectation that curricular 
choices are exclusively theirs seems far less apt. To return to Burke, we find that the 
use of particular terms directs our attention. In this case, we suggest that the use of 
customer service terminology often misdirects.  
 
A second way that the educational enterprise differs significantly from commerce 
emerges when we consider the relationship between functions and constraints. While 
the market is free to respond to trends, whims, and fancy, and to deliver whatever 
product seems attractive at the time, the raison d’etre of education is much more 
narrowly defined. We have one primary function, which although responsive to the 
greater world, and flexible in some measure, remains relatively constant: we educate. 
It will never (and should never) be the case that the secondary services we provide 
(food, housing, transportation, banking, and athletic spectacle/entertainment, for 
example) become primary, regardless of how popular or financially profitable they 
become. To be sure, education is not immune to market forces. However, the action-
reaction nexus in education is not the same as in business. In education, mere market 
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demand is not enough to justify a change in course. Put another way, whereas 
consumer markets can respond to wants, even wants that are arbitrary or 
manufactured, educators are obliged to meet needs, even when those needs are 
unrecognised by those who have them. Knowledge and truth are not market 
commodities in the way that pork bellies and petroleum are; recall the earlier point 
about how delivery does not diminish the supply. Our professional roles and our 
institutional charters both dictate that we recognise educational needs and attempt to 
meet them.  
 
The third and perhaps the most obvious way that education differs from commercial 
enterprises has to do with their practices, and more specifically, who engages in 
them. In commercial exchanges, the terms of the exchange usually specify that the 
customer gives something (usually money) in exchange for goods or services which 
the purveyor is then obliged to provide. It is an exchange so familiar that we take it for 
granted – I pay, you provide. In education, however, although payment is made the 
“product” can never be successfully “delivered” unless the student participates 
actively. An education can not be had unless the person being educated is engaged 
in the process. Lessons can be given, but learning remains the responsibility of the 
learner. The practice of education is, then, necessarily cooperative; it is not a simple 
exchange of services for pay. It is more like what most people would readily recognise 
as professional practice than it is like business practice, the customer service model’s 
suggestion to the contrary notwithstanding.  
 
Professional practice  
 
The practice of clinical psychology is another example of a profession where 
cooperative engagement is required to bring about the desired outcome. Here, in 
order to be successful, a client must work with a therapist to bring about a desired 
result. Although the professional guides the process, it is the client who must do the 
work and the client’s progress (not the work of the professional) is the ultimate 
measure of success. It is worth noting, in this connection, that in the practice of 
clinical psychology a professional must sometimes reject a request made by the 
client/consumer because, in the therapist’s professional judgment, the client’s needs 
would not be well served; so too in education, where the client/consumer does not 
always have the requisite knowledge to know what is needed. Much the same thing 
could be said of physicians, attorneys, and architects, i.e., professionals.  
 
As sociologist Everett C. Hughes notes, “‘[p]rofession’ originally meant the act or fact 
of professing. It has come to mean: ‘The skilled occupation that one professes to be 
skilled in and to follow”. The implications are significant. For the present purpose, this 
is key: because they profess, Hughes continues, professionals ask to be trusted. The 
rule with professional practice, he says, is credat emptor. The reason for this is that, in 
general, because they lack the expertise of the professional they have come to, 
nonprofessionals are not in a position to evaluate their judgments, advice, and 
performance; in short, they must trust them. This rule, credat emptor (i.e., buyer give 
credence to, trust) distinguishes the professional relation from the relation of vendor-
vendee found in markets where, as is well known, the rule is caveat emptor (buyer 
beware) (Hughes, 1965, pp. 1–3). All of this suggests what we believe to be quite 
true, namely, that looking to professional practice (Wueste, 1994, pp. 4–16) for help in 
understanding the educational enterprise holds considerably more promise than 
looking to business practice.  
 
Lastly but perhaps most significantly, the relationship between student and teacher is 
very different from that of vendor and vendee, i.e., customer. In the case of the latter, 
the relationship exists to facilitate a transaction or transactions. The vendor hopes to 
maintain the relationship as long as possible in order to continue to amass 
transactions (and therefore continue to amass profits.) In the former case, the goal is 
focused upon the improvement of the student, and the goal is similar to that of a 
© International Journal for Educational Integrity V l. 6 No. 1 July, 2 10 p. 3–12
8 © International Journal for Educational Integrity Vol. 2 No. 2 December 2006 pp. xx-xx  ISSN 1833-2595  
parent – to reach a point where though continued interactions may be welcome 
indeed, they are unnecessary. Continued interaction is then by choice rather than 
necessity.  
 
Vendor – Vendee, i.e., Customer  
 
The relationship between vendor and vendee is a dyadic relation: xSy “x sells to 
y” (alternatively yBx “y buys from x”). The relation is a simple one: a transaction/
exchange in which a good or service is exchanged for money. The relation is not 
entirely balanced as the obligation to perform rests almost completely with the vendor. 
Apart from a failure to pay, it would be unusual, at least, if the vendor were to claim 
that he had been wronged by the customer. The seller needs to attend to the needs of 
the customer in a way that the customer does not and needn’t match – it’s a sparse 
rather than a rich reciprocal relation.  
 
Teacher – Learner  
 
The relationship between teacher and learner is also a dyadic relation: xTy “x teaches 
y” (alternatively yLx “y learns from x”). The upshot of the relation is not, however, 
mere exchange: The relation creates or produces something (education) rather than 
transferring something. There is another difference between this relation and that of 
vendor and customer: In this case the expectations which, if thwarted, lead to 
complaints of wrongdoing – that one party has been wronged – are found on both 
sides. This is a rich reciprocal relation. It’s here that one finds the moral nub of 
academic integrity; it’s intrinsic to the enterprise of education, the heart of which is the 
relationship between teacher and learner. One seeming complication is that in 
contemporary higher education students work with and rely on their peers in making 
the most of collaborative learning environments and opportunities. Yet, in a very real 
sense, in these learning situations they, i.e., the students, are in it together and 
something akin to the relationship between teacher and learner obtains among all 
those involved in the teaching and learning experience creating a nexus of 
(potentially) beneficial reciprocal relations. Nothing like this occurs with customers; 
customers aren’t “in it together”; indeed in some cases (think Christmas toy shopping 
or online auctions) they are competing with one another.  
 
Still, the customer model does direct us to things that need attention. For instance, the 
model reveals how important it is for teachers to be aware of the needs and abilities of 
students (learning styles and so on too). That’s part of its attractiveness, perhaps 
even its intuitive appeal. Trouble is, it also (wrongly) positions students as passive 
rather than active participants in the process. In a customer-service model, there is no 
expectation that they will be contributing partners in what is in fact a necessarily 
participatory process (of teaching and learning). This model, as it is commonly 
understood, dictates that apart from wanting what the other seems positioned to 
provide, and paying to effect a transfer of it, there’s nothing for the student to do. If we 
are guided by these understandings, we face two very unpalatable consequences: (1) 
success in the educative enterprise becomes less likely, and (2) the interactive 
reciprocity of the enterprise becomes obscured, thereby diminishing the significance 
(or the salience) of academic integrity.  
 
As we have seen, there are several reasons for rejecting the language and practices 
of customer service in education, but perhaps the most important is this: In most 
customer service environments, the responsibility of customers is limited to 
articulating their needs and paying for the goods or services that are produced in 
response. Even though there are a number of businesses that refer to their customers 
as “partners,” there are very few for whom the responsibility for what is produced is 
truly a shared concern.  
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An alternative model  
 
A good place to start in developing an alternative to the customer service model is the 
idea, discussed briefly above, that there is much to be gained in looking to 
professional practice. In fact, starting here promises forward progress on two fronts: 
(1) in our understanding of the educational enterprise, and (2) in seeing new and 
promising ways to promote academic integrity. By returning to the idea that education 
is, in fact, a professional rather than customer service concern, we will focus attention 
more properly on the practices, essential goals, functions, and relationships that are 
most central to teaching and learning.  
 
Practices comprise norms that prescribe or proscribe certain acts as well as norms 
that specify roles and functions; the accountability of those responsible for discharging 
these functions is largely, though not completely, a matter of compliance with these 
norms. Legal philosopher Lon Fuller puts the point succinctly; practices include both 
“a vocabulary of deeds and a basic grammar” (Fuller, 1981, pp. 243–244). The norms 
of a practice constitute a set of internal principles that, in fact, make the practice 
possible, in the sense of creating the capacity to achieve its purpose(s).  
 
Fuller’s idea about the norms internal to a practice, which we are adapting here, 
emerges in a story he tells about a hapless King Rex who fails as a lawmaker in eight 
distinguishable ways. The lesson we learn, according to Fuller, is that lawmakers will 
fail to make law unless they comply with principles internal to the legal enterprise. The 
eight principles of the legal enterprise require laws to be 1) general, 2) promulgated, 
3) typically prospective, not retroactive, 4) clear – that is, readily intelligible. Laws 
must also be such that the acts they require are 5) neither incompatible nor 6) 
impossible to perform. Moreover, 7) laws must not be changed too frequently, and 
finally, 8) there must be a congruence between the rules as declared and the rules as 
administered. As Fuller has it, these eight principles constitute the morality that 
“makes law possible”. Put another way, these norms are key elements in an 
explanation of how lawmaking is possible, in particular, of how the legal enterprise 
can achieve the purpose of making behaviors normatively non-optional, in a word, 
obligatory (Fuller, 1969, p. 39). 
 
Fuller can speak for himself:  
 
Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a 
moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from 
him, or that came into existence only after he had acted, or was unintelligible, 
or was contradicted by another rule of the same system, or commanded the 
impossible, or changed every minute. It may not be impossible for a man to 
obey a rule that is disregarded by those charged with its administration, but at 
some point obedience becomes futile – as futile, in fact, as casting a vote that 
will never be counted. As the sociologist Simmel has observed, there is a kind 
of reciprocity between government and the citizen with respect to the 
observance of rules. (Fuller, 1969, p. 39) 
 
The “principle of reciprocity” is a key element in Fuller’s account of law’s capacity to 
obligate. Indeed, as Fuller has it, “the notion of reciprocity [is] implicit in the very 
notion of duty – at least in the case of every duty that runs toward society or toward 
another responsible human being” (Fuller, 1969, p. 21). Thus, a complete rupture of 
the “bond of reciprocity” between government and citizen leaves nothing “on which to 
ground the citizen’s duty to observe the rules” (Fuller, 1969, pp. 39–40). Fuller 
maintains, rightly we believe, that the principle of reciprocity “has roots…in our 
professions [and] in our practices” (Fuller, 1969, p. 21). In some cases, he says, “it is 
obvious to those affected by it; [in others] it traces a more subtle and obscure course 
through the institutions and practices of society” (Fuller, 1969, p. 22). 
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Returning to the idea that norms internal to a practice explain its ability to achieve its 
purpose(s), it may be helpful to consider a simpler case than lawmaking. The practice 
of casting ballots involves a settled and stable expectation that a vote cast for 
candidate A will be counted as a vote for candidate A. The principle here, that votes 
should (must) be faithfully counted, is intrinsic to the practice of voting or elections. 
Both the meaning of a voter’s participation in an election and the successful 
functioning of the practice depend on compliance with it (Fuller, 1981, p. 92). 
 
Again, the key idea of the approach we advocate in developing an alternative to the 
customer service model is the idea that the capacity of a practice or enterprise to 
achieve its purpose depends on compliance with a set of internal principles. Fuller 
puts the idea another way, and as we shall see, it resonates deeply with our 
suggestion that by returning to the idea that education is, in fact, a professional rather 
than customer service concern and focusing attention on the essential practices, 
goals, functions, and relationships that are most central to teaching and learning we 
will be able to see new and promising ways to promote academic integrity. What he 
says is this: an enterprise such as legislation or election, for example, “[has] an 
integrity of [its] own which must be respected if [it is] to be effective at all” (Fuller, 
1981, p. 91). 
 
Let’s apply this idea to the academy and ask what is required if the educational 
enterprise of higher education is to achieve its purpose(s): please take a moment to 
think about this and then write down what you have come up with. Please do this 
before reading further. Really....  
 
Here’s a provisional response to the question “What is required if the educational 
enterprise of higher education is to achieve its purpose(s)?”:  
 
 honest reports and representations  
 transparency/openness rather than secretiveness  
 trust, which is the foundation of reasonable reliance  
 accountability, on an individual as well as institutional level  
 recognition of limits  
 respect (but not deference) for established authority and innovation  
 a mechanism for attribution and citation that creates an accurate “trail” of ideas 
and findings; this is necessary for several purposes including  
 giving credit where credit is due  
 knowing where an investigator/writer/thinker made a wrong turn  
 knowing where to go to find out more – to continue and enhance the 
inquiry  
 honoring rights in ideas (intellectual property)  
 a sense of community and common purpose that can keep the competitive 
drive of individuals on a short leash.  
 
What we have here are ideas/norms implicit in the educational enterprise that are 
essential elements in the collection of things necessary for successful teaching and 
learning. It’s not surprising that they might just as well be referred to as elements of 
academic integrity in the Fullerian sense that the academy “[has] an integrity of [its] 
own which must be respected if [it is] to be effective at all”. Moreover, the reciprocity 
implicit in them seems to confirm the idea, stressed earlier, that the success of the 
educational enterprise depends on the efforts of those being “served” at least as 
much as it depends on the efforts of those providing the “service”. The suggestion that 
we will make in closing (since making the full dress case is beyond the scope of our 
project here) is that seeing the principles of academic integrity in this way should 
make it easier for students to (1) understand why those of us who have made our 
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careers in the academy expect, in fact, demand compliance with them, and (2) come to 
“own” them and see them as constraints one accepts voluntarily when one becomes a 
participant in the enterprise of higher education.  
 
Conclusion  
 
We believe that an alternative to the customer service model should speak 
straightforwardly rather than in a Pickwickian fashion. The model we prefer relies on the 
mores of professional practice, highlights the reciprocal dimensions of teaching and 
learning, and articulates the principles that are central to the enterprise of education. 
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